Abstract-In this paper, we propose a secure transmission scheme based on deleting and inserting symbols. The proposed encryption/decryption method is novel since it achieves secrecy by a transmitter that deliberately introduces synchronization errors (insertions and/or deletions) based on a shared source of randomness. The intended receiver, having access to the same shared source of randomness as the transmitter, can resynchronize the received sequence. On the other hand, the eavesdropper's channel remains a synchronization error channel. We show that the scheme achieves information theoretic security. We prove a secrecy capacity theorem, provide a lower bound on the secrecy capacity, and propose numerical methods to evaluate it.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the oldest forms of a cipher, encryption/decryption algorithm, in cryptography is the book cipher. Loosely speaking, a book cipher is a cipher based on using a book to transmit secret information. A particular version that we are interested in has been dated back to at least Blaise de Vigenre [1] , [2] in 1586. In this cipher, intended users share a private key, which is a particular book. To send a message, the sender transmits locations of words/letters, through an unsecure channel, to the intended recipient. When the received message is combined with the pre-shared book, the intended recipient will be able to recover the message. An eavesdropper will see the positions, but not knowing which book they use renders the intercepted message potentially useless. A great historical account of the inception of the book cipher is provided by Leighton and Matyas [2] . Using motivation from this well known cipher, we consider the reverse problem. In particular, we effectively introduce a cipher based on sharing a secret key which consists of letter/word locations. Using the message and pre-shared key, we then create a book, of course in our instance the book is not a human readable book. The resulting book is transmitted over an unsecure channel. Combining the book with the preshared key, results in the secret message. We call this method the reverse book cipher 1 .
Using the notion of a reverse book cipher, we design a system in such a way that we lessen the computational difficulty of encryption (decryption), which consequently increases the computational difficulty of decryption (encryption). Thus we design a method tailored for situations where there are distributed devices with limited processing power, communicating with larger base stations that have fewer restrictions on power/computation, e.g., internet of things. In addition to limited power and computational capability, another limitation that these devices have in common is that they transmit over noisy channels. They require error correction codes and specialized processors for reliable communications. A natural question arises, can we combine error correction codes and the idea of a reverse book cipher to securely communicate? The strategy we employ is as follows. Alice uses a stochastic encoder to encode S k , i.e., the plaintext, into X n . Instead of transmitting the codeword X n , Alice uses a secret shared source of randomness to randomly inject synchronization errors into the transmitted sequence, resulting in Z (n) , i.e., the ciphertext. We assume that both Bob and Eve receive (noisefree) 2 the same symbols from the transmitter (see Fig. 1 ). Bob has access to the shared source of randomness and can thus resynchronize the received sequence, although not necessarily recover X n . Using the associated decoder, Bob recovers X n and finally the plaintext. On the other hand Eve does not have access to the shared source of randomness, and is thus forced to attempt to decode the transmitted codeword with synchronization errors.
A. Related Works
Wyner's seminal paper [3] proved it was possible to communicate securely using wiretap codes, assuming the composite channels were discrete and memoryless. Csiszar and Korner [4] generalized Wyner's results to broadcast channels, where the unintended user does not neccesarily listen to the output of the main channel through a noisier channel. Hayashi [5] further generalized the preceeding results to arbitrary channels with finite output alphabet. Hayashi's results were based upon using the information spectrum approach originating with Han and Verdu [6] . His results were particularly interesting since he included non-asymptotic results on secrecy capacity. Bloch and Laneman [7] built upon Csiszar and Hayashi's work in using channel resolvability as a basis for stronger secrecy results based on variational distance and hold for the most general of channels, e.g., arbitrary alphabets, memory, etc... A recent literature overview of secrecy codes and associated wiretap channels is provided by [8] . Secrecy results in wiretap channels have mainly been provided for memoryless channels, and additive noise. The system we present in this paper has memory, non-additive noise, and a countably infinite output alphabet.
The main obstacle to achieving secrecy through wiretap codes over wiretap (or similar) channels [3] , [4] , [7] is that the secrecy proof hinges on knowing, and guaranteeing the eavesdropper's channel characteristics. In practice, the eavesdropper is typically an adversary and will not reveal her channel characteristics. For this reason, we use a reverse book cipher to artificially create a wiretap channel based on a shared secret between intended users. Our goal is to use the framework provided by wiretap channels and the corresponding secrecy codes to create cryptographic primitives. The general model of computationally distinguishing an idealized cryptosystem from an actual implementation of the system has been proposed in Maurer [9] . A recent overview of the progress in this area is provided in [10] .
A well studied cipher based on the notion of a secret shared source of randomness is the one time pad. The one time pad [11] , [12] is one of the most well studied cryptosystems, and is an example of an additive cypher, i.e., the shared source of randomness, the one time pad, is added to the plaintext. Furthermore, the one time pad when implemented correctly is provably information theoretic secure [12] . The method presented in this paper differs from the one time pad, because it is based on designing a cipher system that is not additive. We pursue design of a non-additive cipher due to security concerns in actual implementation. Specifically, it is well known the weaknesses in using pseudorandom number generation to replace the shared source of randomness in the one time pad, otherwise known as a stream cipher. For a good overview of stream ciphers see Robshaw [13] . We present a method such that, at a minimum, knowing the plaintext and ciphertext will not uniquely determine the shared key.
Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows. We introduce a cryptographic primitive, i.e., reverse book cipher, based on a secret shared source of randomness. We prove that this system is secure under an information theoretic security criteria in Bloch-Laneman [7] , and we therefore can communicate securely. Finally, we provide lower bounds on the secrecy capacity of the presented scheme.
B. Outline
In Section II, we present our transmission scheme, and an equivalent wiretap channel based on synchronization errors with insertions and deletions. We then apply Bloch and Laneman [7] to lower bound the secrecy capacity in Section III.
In Section IV, we present hidden Markov techniques that allow us to estimate and bound the corresponding information rates. Due to the inherent difficulty of computing such rates in closed form for synchronization error channels, e.g., insertion/deletion channels, in this paper we also reveal a reduced state technique to lower bound the secrecy capacity. The lower bounding technique is constructive in the sense that it reveals the source distribution that achieves the bound. Finally, in Section V, we plot lower bounds for the secrecy capacity of the erasure/deletion, and insertion wiretap channels.
C. Notation
An alphabet of symbols is denoted by a calligraphic letter, say X . Given two elements a, b ∈ X , we denote their concatenation by a b ab. We denote the length zero word, by θ, where a θ = θ a = a. An alphabet X does not necessarily contain θ. An n-fold Cartesian product of X is denoted by X n . The alphabet obtained by the n-fold concatenation of symbols from X is denoted by X (n) , and by definition
Given a base alphabet, X , and x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ∈ X , we define the
Given an alphabet X , we form X as the alphabet that consists of all finite-length concatenations of symbols from X , i.e.,
Random variables are denoted by upper-case letters, (X), and their realizations by lower case letters (x). If k denotes discrete time, then X k denotes a random variable at time k drawn from the alphabet X . Likewise, X k is assumed to be drawn from X . A sequence of random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n is denoted by X n , and we have
, and we have X (n) ∈ X (n) . Given two random variables, X and Y , the information-spectrum is a random variable, denoted by I(X; Y ). The expected value of I(X; Y ) will be denoted as I(X; Y ) = E[I(X; Y )]. Similarly, H(X) , a random variable, denotes the entropy-spectrum, and H(X) denotes the expected value. We denote the binary entropy function as follows 3 
The variational distance between two random variables say X, X ∈ X with corresponding probability density functions
II. TRANSMISSION WIRETAP MODEL

A. Transmission Scheme
Let X k be the channel input drawn from the finite alphabet, X = {0, 1} (see Fig. 1 ). Our synchronization error channel has insertions and deletions with respective probabilities i and d. Let Z k be the transmitter output drawn from the alphabet Z, where Z = X . Given X n , we assume intended users have access to a shared source of randomness, R, which we define as a sequence of geometric random variables, N 1 , N 2 , . . . , N n with probability, 1 − i, and a sequence of
Note that the choice of distributions used is based on the historical definition of a synchronization error channel with insertions and deletions. In practice, these distributions can be altered. The symbols Z k are drawn using this shared source of randomness, R, as in algorithm 1.
Observe the intended receiver has access to the shared source of randomness, i.e., Fig. 2 ). We have that Z
(1) = 011, Z (2) = 0111, Z (3) = 0111, and Z (4) = 011100. Thus Alice transmits 011100. After resynchronization, Bob has (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ) = (0, 1, ε, 0).
. . , z 6 = 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0 011 1 00 
B. Equivalent Wiretap Channel Model
An equivalent wiretap channel model (see Fig. 3 ), in the terms of Bloch and Laneman [7] , consists of the main channel being an erasure channel, and the wiretap channel being an insertion channel followed by an ε-deletion channel. We define an ε-deletion channel as a channel that deletes the erasure symbols, ε. In particular, note a deletion channel is equivalent to an erasure channel followed by an ε-deletion channel. 
III. SECRECY CAPACITY
A main strength of Bloch's and Laneman's proof [7] of secrecy using information spectra, and channel resolvability is the generality of their proof. In particular their notation uses Z n for channel output, i.e., the output is synchronized with the channel input. Similarly to Han [16] p. 100, we claim that the results [7] apply to more general channels, e.g., the synchronization error wiretap model with output Z (n) . Given a sequence of stochastic codes with corresponding source S k , and output Z (n) , the stochastic codes satisfy secrecy metric S 2 if and only if
Theorem III.1. (Bloch-Laneman Secrecy Capacity) [7] The secrecy capacity, C s , of the synchronization error wiretap model for secrecy metric S 2 is,
where the process {V n , X n } n≥1 satisfies,
Proof: The proof in [7] is written for channels in which Z (n) = Z n , and uses two corollaries in Pinsker [17] . Note that the two Pinsker [17] [16] which hold for channels with synchronization errors.
Corollary III.2. (Lower Bound for the Secrecy Capacity of the Insertion/Deletion Wiretap Channel Model) Let M represent the set of all homogeneous Markov chains defined on the alphabet X . Then
C s ≥ max {X n }∈M lim n→∞ 1 n I(X n ; Y (n) ) − I(X n ; Z (n) )(5)
Proof: In our channel model we have assumed the wiretap channel is a degraded version of the main channel. Thus the supremum (4) is attained for
If X n is a homogeneous Markov process, the limit I = lim n→∞ 1 n I(X n ; Z (n) ) exists and is finite (see general proof in [15] , but without sup in equation 2.7). Furthermore, as in [15] , p 17-19, the two sequences, X n and Z (n) , satisfy,
This is obtained in a similar fashion as in Dobrushin [15] , but again without the sup in eq. 2.7 of [15] . It follows that,
Observe the main channel is a discrete memoryless channel. Furthermore, given a stationary and ergodic input process, the output process is clearly stationary and ergodic. Thus,
Finally, the inequality in (5) follows because we restricted the input to homogeneous Markov processes.
Our intent in looking at the combined insertion/deletion channel, is to balance the output. We would like the ability to satisfy power requirements of the transmitter or receiver by altering the deletion and insertion probabilities. We shall now look at two contrasting cases, namely i = 0 and d = 0.
1) Insertion Wiretap Channel:
The d = 0 scenario is attractive if the receiver has power (and computational) restrictions since the main channel is noiseless. We see that once in sync with the transmitter, the receiver is only required to demodulate bits declared as non-insertion bits by the shared random source, i.e., X n = Y n . Thus the decoder is easy to implement on a low power device. The secrecy capacity, which we denote with C si , is bounded as
where X n is an arbitrary Markov process.
2) Deletion/Erasure Wiretap Channel:
For the deletion/erasure wiretap model we have i = 0. This is the dual case to the insertion wiretap channel in the sense that the deletion of bits is relatively easy to implement at the transmitter. The main channel is now a discrete memoryless erasure channel for which there are well known codes, yet the receiver still requires some computational power to decode. This is a good choice if the transmitter is power limited (because it transmits fewer bits) but the receiver has ample power/computational resources. The secrecy capacity for this model, denoted by C sd , is now bounded as
where X n is an arbitrary Markov process. Furthermore note equality holds above since the main channel is an erasure channel implying
IV. NUMERICALLY BOUNDING C s
In this section we construct numerical techniques to lower bound C si and C sd of the insertion and deletion eavesdropper's channels given in the previous section, respectively. We shall assume the input process X n is an M -th order binary Markov process, i.e., X = {0, 1}, whose 2 M ×2 M transition probability matrix is P. Let I denote the 2 M × 2 M identity matrix. The output of the eavesdropper's channel is Z (n) ∈ Z = X . The main channel (X n → Y n ) is a memoryless erasure channel, and Y n ∈ Y n = {ε, 0, 1} n .
A. Computing lim
Using Lemma II.1, we have
where Z k is the sequence of symbols Z k at the output of the eavesdropper's channel. [Note,
k , whereas Z (n) ∈ Z.] Next, we notice that the sequence Z k is itself a hidden Markov process with an underlying Markov state sequence S k whose transition probability matrix is Q (explicitly given further down). That is,
where Q(s m−1 , s m ) are entries in Q. The state s m is described as a binary string. If X n is a Markov source of order M, then s m is a binary string of length M . We denote by l(s m ) the last (i.e. the M -th) binary digit of s m . With this notation, we can fully describe the hidden Markov process Z k as follows.
1) Insertion channel:
We have, 2) Deletion channel: We have,
Since Z k is hidden Markov, its information rate is computable using trellis-based Monte-Carlo techniques [18] . 
B. Bounding lim
2) Deletion Wiretap Channel:
For the deletion channel (see Fig.5 Because of the spatial constraints, we do not fully describe the method for reducing the states, but refer the reader to [19] for general reduced-state techniques for upper bounding entropy rates. The trellises constructed for computing the conditional entropy rate, lim n→∞ 1 n H Z (n) |X n , for the deletion and insertion channels have the form as in Fig. 5 and Fig. 4 , respectively. Note that the trellises are drawn/constructed only after a realization x 1 , x 2 , . . . becomes available.
C. Optimization of Markov Sources
Any Markov source will result in a lower bound for C si and C sd . The best lower bound is obtained by maximizing the bound for varying Markov orders and Markov chain parameter P. This optimization can be done by a generalized BlahutArimoto algorithm [20] [21] adapted to wiretap channels [22] .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this paper, we present only numerical results (see Fig. 6 ) for Markov processes of order M = 1, thereby we do not resort to Blahut-Arimoto-type optimizations because an exhaustive search optimization is feasible for low-order Markov processes. For both the insertion and deletion channel we averaged 100 simulations that were run on a trellis of length 10 5 . We see for the insertion channel that although lim i→1 C si = 1 in our transmission scheme, this is of little help. Observe in our model we are simulating an insertion channel. Thus Bob would only receive inserted bits. Thus we must also look at the effective transmission rate, R E , which we define as,
, where R is the rate of the stochastic code. The effective rate, R E takes into account we are artificially creating our synchronization error channel, and therefore Bob receives output from the wiretap channel. Observe for combined insertion/deletion system, we have R E = 
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a secrecy system based on synchronization errors, and provided techniques to lower bound the secrecy capacity. Furthermore, we have evaluated these bounds (using first order Markov input) for two important instantiations of the model. The presented transmission scheme has several advantages with regards to system design. We have the ability to choose insertion and deletion probabilities to satisfy receiver, and transmitter requirements. In particular, we see in a system with powerful base stations, and lightweight distributed sensors, the base stations can transmit based on d = 0 < i < 1 and the lightweight sensors can transmit based on i = 0 < d < 1. Thus the lightweight sensors transmit less, and decrypt easier, while the base stations can transmit more, and decode using computationally intensive error correction decoders.
